Dynamic matching and bargaining games provide models of decentralized trading with frictions. A central objective of the literature is to investigate how equilibrium outcomes depend on the level of the frictions. In particular, will the outcome become e¢ cient when frictions become small? Existing speci…cations of such games give di¤erent answers. To investigate what causes these di¤erence we identify four simple conditions on trading outcomes and their relation to the level of frictions. We show that for every game which satis…es these conditions, the equilibrium outcome becomes e¢ cient when frictions are small. We illustrate this approach with two games in which we show that our conditions hold, implying that the limiting outcome is e¢ cient. We then proceed to speci…cations of dynamic matching and bargaining games in which limiting equilibrium outcomes do not need to become e¢ cient. We show that our conditions do not hold in these games. # JEL Classi…cations: D44, D82, D83
Introduction
In a dynamic matching and bargaining game, a large population of traders interacts repeatedly in a decentralized market. Every trading period, traders are matched into small groups where they bargain over the terms of trade. If they fail to reach an agreement, they can wait at some costs until the next period to be rematched into a new group. These waiting costs are the frictions of trading in the decentralized market. A major question in the literature concerns the trading outcome with vanishing frictions:
Will the outcome become e¢ cient? Ideally, one would like not only to …nd answers for particular trading institutions but also to gain general understanding of the conditions under which trading with vanishing frictions has this property and when it does not. This is the task of this paper. The main contribution is the provision of a general, "detail free" framework for the analysis of decentralized markets. Recent contributions that fall into the framework of this paper include Moreno and Wooders (2001) , Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2006) , and De Fraja and Sakovics (2001) .
As a basic set-up we use the following steady state, dynamic matching and bargaining environment similar to the one used by Gale (1987) : 1 There is a continuum of buyers who have unit demand and valuations v 2 [0; 1] for an indivisible good and there is a continuum of sellers who have unit capacity and costs c 2 [0; 1]. These traders are matched into small groups. In these groups they bargain and, if they reach an agreement, they trade. The groups are connected to form a large market by allowing unsuccessful traders to be matched into new groups in the next period. Integration, however, is imperfect because there is a probability 2 (0; 1) that a trader dies while waiting.
These are the frictions of trading. To keep the market in a steady state, there is an exogeneous in ‡ow of new buyers and sellers at the end of each period.
This framework is general with respect to the matching technology and with respect to the bargaining protocol, i.e. we do not specify how traders are matched into groups.
Also, we do not specify how bargaining within the groups takes place and what information is released before and during bargaining. We will see how existing models in the literature di¤er in how they …ll in these details. But no matter how this is done, every speci…cation of the model will give rise to an outcome which consists of (a) probabilities of trading for entering types and (b) expected equilibrium payo¤s. Let Q S (c) denote the probability that a seller of type c sells his good and let Q B (v) denote the probability that a buyer of type v gets the good. Similarly, let V S (c) and V B (v) be the payo¤s to these types. So an outcome is a vector A = Q S ; Q B ; V S ; V B .
Outcomes are de…ned across models. We state four conditions on outcomes and we argue that these conditions are natural. To illustrate and to motivate these conditions, we introduce a basic model by specifying the matching technology and the bargaining protocol as in Lauermann (2006a) : We assume that matching is pairwise and "groups" consist of one seller and one buyer. Within each match, the seller makes a take-it-orleave-it price o¤er to the buyer. An important assumption is that information is private so that the seller cannot observe the valuation of the buyer. Now, suppose there is some sequence of exit rates f k g 1 k=1 which converges to zero, k ! 0 and for every k 2 (0; 1) take some associated trading outcome A k of some equilibrium of the speci…cation described before. The …rst condition on outcomes A k is that trading probabilities Q S k ( ) and Q B k ( ) are monotone in types. The second condition is that the di¤erence of payo¤s between types is bounded. Outcomes of the basic model have this property because of asymmetric information which implies that traders can mimic each others'strategies. The third condition is that whenever trading probabilities of some set of buyers do not converge to one as k becomes small, these buyers become available, i.e. a seller can be certain to be matched with such a buyer at least once in his lifetime. The fourth condition states that if a seller of type c x is almost certain to be matched with a buyer of type v x or better and a buyer of type v x is certain to be matched with a seller of type c x or better, i.e. if types c c x and v v x are available, then their joint payo¤ becomes pairwise e¢ cient and V S (c x ) + V B (v x ) is at least v x c x in the limit. One might expect this condition to hold since otherwise there would be unrealized surplus left on the table and the respective traders c x and v x would be able to …nd trading partners with whom to realize that surplus.
Let S (A) be the surplus of an outcome A and let S be its maximum. Our main result is this: Every sequence of outcomes fA k g 1 k=1 which satis…es the four conditions stated before becomes e¢ cient when becomes small:
Then we show that these conditions are met in many speci…cations of the framework.
They hold not only with asymmetric information but also in a model similar to Gale's own speci…cation with symmetric information. We give some intuition that the conditions hold even in the non-steady state model of Moreno and Wooders (2001) . Also, we provide some intuition for the case of bargaining between one seller and many buyers, when the seller holds a second price auction.
Auctions are also used to specify the bargaining protocol in the model of Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2006) . But just as Gale (1987) , they include an entry stage and assume that traders are in…nitely lived. To show that our approach is also valid with these additional complications, we extend our general framework by including an entry decision and by considering the case where the exit rate is set equal to zero. In this new framework we need stronger conditions to ensure convergence to e¢ ciency, discussed in detail in section 6.
To show that our conditions are "tight" we show that convergence to e¢ ciency fails if our conditions are violated and relate this to the failure of convergence in the literature.
In particular, we show that the failure in Lauermann (2006b) can be traced back to the failure of the second condition, the failure in Diamond (1971) can be traced to the failure of availability (the third condition), the failure in Serrano (2002) to the failure of weak e¢ ciency (the fourth condition), and the failure in De Fraja and Sakovics (2001) to the observation that in their model pairwise e¢ ciency for all types is not a su¢ cient condition for e¢ ciency.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. First, we introduce the basic model in section 2. Then we provide the general framework in section 3.1 and in section 3.2 we discuss necessary and su¢ cient conditions for outcomes to be e¢ cient. We introduce the four conditions on outcomes in section 3.3. We prove our main result in the next section:
Every sequence of outcomes that meets the four conditions becomes e¢ cient. In section 5 we demonstrate that the conditions are met in some examples. We introduce some variations of the general framework by adding an entry stage (section 6.1) and assuming that traders are in…nitely lived (section 6.2). Failures of convergence to e¢ ciency are discussed in section 7. The in ‡ow of buyers and the in ‡ow of sellers has mass one each. The distribution of valuations among buyers in the in ‡ow is exogeneously given by some c.d.f. G B ( ) and similarly, the distribution of costs is given by some distribution G S ( ). We assume that G B ( ) and G S ( ) have continuous and strictly positive densities. Let p w be the price such that the mass of sellers in the in ‡ow with costs below p w is exactly equal to the mass of buyers with valuations above p w :
The Basic Model
Since the left hand side is strictly increasing while the right hand side is strictly decreasing, the solution to (1) We say that a vector constitutes an equilibrium if strategies are mutually optimal given the distribution of types and if the distribution of types in the pool is consistent with the trading strategies and the exogeneous in ‡ow. These conditions are now spelled out in detail.
First we turn to the sellers. If the seller o¤ers a price p, let us denote by D (pj ) the probability that the buyer accepts the o¤er. Buyers accept a price p if p r (v) (see
Let q S (pj ) be the probability that a seller can trade some time during his lifetime
which we also call lifetime trading probability, and which is the solution to the recursive formula
The expected payo¤ to a seller when o¤ering a price p is de…ned as
and we require that p (c) 2 arg max U S ( ; cj ) for all c in equilibrium.
For buyers, let S (rj ) denote the probability to receive an o¤er p r in any period.
Again, we de…ne the lifetime trading probability by
The expected price o¤er conditional on p r is denoted by E [pjp r; ]. 4 Payo¤s when accepting all p r are given by
Let V B (vj ) sup r U B (r; vj ). Suppose that the following condition holds
Then a buyer who receives an o¤er p = r (v) is just indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting the o¤er: Then his payo¤ from accepting the o¤er, v r (v), is equal to his 3 Later, r ( ) is shown to be monotone, and D (pj ) simpli…es to 1 B r 1 (p) ; r 1 (p) = inf fv; 1jr (v) pg. 4 If Q B (r) = 0, then E [pjp r] r:
payo¤ from rejection, which is the continuation payo¤ (1 ) V B (vj ). If p < r (v), the buyer is strictly better o¤ when accepting the o¤er and when p > r (v), the buyer is strictly better o¤ accepting the o¤er. Hence, it is optimal for a buyer to accept a price if it is below r (v) and to reject the price otherwise. 5 We restrict attention to equilibria in which the pool does not change over time. If the distribution at the beginning of a period is given by S t ( ) and the trading strategies are r ( ) and p ( ), then the distribution of sellers at the end of the period is sum of the entering sellers and the initial sellers who did neither trade nor die:
The pool of traders is in a steady state if and only if the distribution of types does not change over time. For sellers we need that S t+1 (cj ) = S t (c) = S (c) for all c. This condition can be written as 6
for all c.
A similar condition can be obtained for buyers:
for all v.
Summing up, we say is an equilibrium if it satis…es the above conditions:
De…nition 1 A steady state equilibrium vector 2 consists of an optimal pair of strategies and a corresponding steady state pool, i.e.
and M satisfy the steady state conditions (6), (7) . 5 In our model, we assume that buyers use reservation prices. In general, reservation price strategies are the unique optimal sequentially rational strategies when sampling without recall from a known stationary distribution of prices, see McMillan and Rothschild (1994) . 6 We get this by algebraic manipulation of
The General Approach
Now we start with the analysis of the outcomes of the general framework. In the next subsection we introduce some basic notation and make some preliminary observations. Then we show that outcomes are e¢ cient if they are "Walrasian" and we derive a su¢ -cient condition for e¢ ciency to prepare our proof of convergence. Finally, we introduce the four conditions that we use to characterize outcomes.
Outcomes
An outcome is a vector A = V S ( ) ; V B ( ) ; Q S ( ) ; Q B ( ) , where V S (c) is the expected payo¤ of an entering seller with type c and Q S (c) is his (lifetime) trading probability.
Similarly, V B (v) is the expected payo¤ of an entering buyer of type v and Q B (v) is his (lifetime) trading probability. We de…ne T S ( ) and T B ( ) such that
i.e. T S (c) V S (c) + cQ S (c) and
We assume that there is no discounting, 7 so T S ( ) and T B ( ) can be interpreted as expected transfers. Given an outcome A, the surplus of entering traders is de…ned as
We assume that all functions are measurable, i.e. A 2 4 M and S ( ) : 4 M ! R. Since these functions are also bounded (by de…nition) this allows us to use the Lebesgue integral to de…ne a distance between two functions, 8 We use d ( ; ) to de…ne convergence in M . Furthermore, in many cases we can restrict further the set of functions to the set of monotone functions.
This will turn out to be helpful for our proofs because every sequence of monotone functions has a convergent subsequence, i.e. sets of monotone functions are sequentially compact. 9 For future references, let + M be the subset of weakly increasing 7 When we consider in…nitely lived agents in section 6.2 we also discuss the implications of a model with discounting. We show that the basic insights still apply. 8 Note that d ( ; ) is only a semimetric: d (f1; f2) does not imply f1 = f2. Still d (f1; f2) is nonnegative and symmetric, and it sati…es d (f1; f1) = 0 and the triangle-inequality. We endow M with the semimetric topology (see Aliprantis, Border (1994, p. 23) , de…ned in the natural way by using open " balls B" (f1) = ff 2 M jd (f1; f ) < "g to de…ne open sets just as in a metric space.
9 By Helly's selection theorem (see Kolmogorov, Fomin 1970 , p. 372) every sequence ffN g A natural consistency requirement on an outcome is that total transfers collectively made by all buyers are equal to total transfers received by all sellers,
From (8), it follows that this is equivalent to the following condition on A:
De…ne S Q (A)
Condition (9) is equivalent to
This equality re ‡ects the idea that for the purpose of welfare analysis only the allocation of the good matters while transfers "cancel".
Similar to the balance of transfers, the total mass of buyers who trade is required to be equal to the total mass of sellers who trade:
Economically, this condition corresponds to the scarcity of the good: For every buyer who enjoys consumption there must be some seller who incurs costs. We de…ne the set Q of all trading outcomes satisfying balance of total trades: (11) holds .
An outcome A satis…es mass balance if it satis…es the two consistency conditions:
De…nition 2 Mass balance. An outcome A = V S ( ) ; V B ( ) ; Q S ( ) ; Q B ( ) satis…es mass balance of trades and transfers if
We say a sequence of outcomes fA k g 1 k=1 satis…es mass balance if each of its members A k is inÂ. monotone functions has a pointwise convergent subsequence ff N 0 g 1 N =1 . Lebesgue's bounded convergence theorem implies d f N 0 ; f ! 0 for some f . The limit f is clearly monotone itself.
E¢ ciency
Now, we want to know which outcomes are e¢ cient and we want to …nd conditions that ensure that a sequence of outcomes converges to e¢ ciency to prepare for the proof. Our object of interest is the maximal surplus that can be reached subject to the resource constraint Q 2Q:
Basic economic intuition suggests that the optimal allocation is the following: All buyers with valuations above the market clearing price p w get the good while all sellers with costs below p w sell theirs; buyers with lower valuations and sellers with higher costs do not trade. Let Q W be the set of Walrasian allocations of the good that are equivalent 10 to this rule:
And indeed, the economic intuition proves to be correct (see the appendix for details):
Lemma 1 For all outcomes that satisfy mass balance, i.e. for all A 2Â: S (A) = S if and only if Q 2 Q W .
Accordingly, the maximal surplus S is given by:
LetQ + be the set of trading probabilities which are monotone and which satisfy mass balance of trades, i.e.Q +
sequentially compact, we can show that the former lemma also holds in the limit: a sequence of outcomes fQ k g 1 k=1 becomes e¢ cient if and only if it converges to the set Q W . We say that a sequence fQ k g 
Next, we derive a simple su¢ cient condition for the e¢ ciency of an outcome: Suppose the outcome is such that for any cost c x and for any valuation v x , joint payo¤s V S (c x ) + V B (v x ) are weakly larger than the private surplus v x c x . Then this implies that A is e¢ cient, i.e. S (A) = S :
Lemma 3 Su¢ ciency. If some outcome satis…es mass balance, i.e. if A 2Â and if for all v and for all c:
Together with the de…nition of p we use this to bound S (A):
where the last line follows from the de…nition of p w . By the restriction A 2Â and by
By continuity of S ( ), the last lemma carries over to sequences (see the appendix for details). For technical reasons, we restrict the elements of A k to the set of outcomeŝ A + Â which satisfy mass balance and which are monotone in each component,Â +
Lemma 4 For every sequence fA k g
General Conditions
Now we state the four conditions. For this, we take some sequence of exit rates f k g 1 k=1
and for each exit rate k we take some outcome A k . This gives us a sequence fA k g 1 k=1 . In order to characterize limiting functions (whenever they exist) we denote their pointwise limits by upper bars. For sequences of trading probabilities
and for sequences of payo¤s
The …rst two conditions are conditions on each element of the sequence while the other two are conditions on its limit. We motivate the former two by the trading situation with asymmetric information in the basic model. 11 (In section 5.1 we prove in detail that the conditions hold.) The main observation is that with asymmetric information, a type c can mimic the strategy of another type c x . If he does so, he receives a transfer T S k (c x ) and trades with probability Q S k (c x ). Thus, for V S k (c) to be the equilibrium payo¤ for type c, V S k (c) must be at least as large as
. The same observations apply to buyers. So payo¤s and trading probabilities have to satisfy incentive compatibility constraints. Because payo¤s can be shown to satisfy the single crossing condition, this requires in particular that trading probabilities are monotone (for details, see section
5.1):
Condition 1 Monotonicity. For every member A k of the sequence fA k g 1 k=1 :
Furthermore, incentive compatibility requires that the di¤erence of payo¤s between any two types is bounded: Suppose the seller c x trades with probability one and suppose in addition that type c has a cost advantage (c x c), then the pro…t to c from this strategy is (c x c) higher than the payo¤ of c x . Hence, equilibrium payo¤s to c must be at least (c x c) higher than the equilibrium payo¤ of c x , with (c x c) being the rent of this seller. In general, the trading probability of c x might be below one and so the payo¤ di¤erence must be somewhere between zero and (c x c). Note, that the di¤erence cannot become larger than one, since otherwise c x would like to mimic the type c. Again, the same applies to buyers:
and for every c, c x 2 [0; 1] there is some a 2 [0; 1] such that 12 1 1 See the remark on page 22 on why the condition also holds in the model by Gale (1987) with symmetric information. 1 2 Here and in the following conditions, by referring to limits we implicitly condition on their existence. So the statement includes the implicit quali…er "whenever the pointwise limits V S (c), V S (cx), and
The no rent extraction property immediately implies monotonicity and continuity of the payo¤ functions, something we will utilize in the proof. In particular, monotonicity and continuity carry over to the limiting functions V S and V B . 13
Remark: With asymmetric information we can state the bound more tightly as
and similarly for buyers (see (18)). However, here we want to …nd conditions which are just strong enough to imply the convergence result but still weak enough so that they hold in a broad range of models. In particular, we want to include the possibility of symmetric information which precludes us to state the conditions in the way described before.
For the two other conditions we introduce the concept of availability. The availability of the set of buyers with valuations above some v 00 is the probability that a seller is matched with some v 2 [v 00 ; 1] at least once during his lifetime. Intuitively, the share of a set of buyers in the pool is proportional to the probability that they do not trade but stay in the market until they die, i.e. the higher at least once, given the exit rate k and the outcome A k . 14 
The observation given before becomes the condition
Introducing a similar function L S ( ) for sellers, we state
Suppose it is commonly known that types c x and v x are available, i.e. buyers and sellers are mutually sure to meet some c c x and some v v x , respectively. Then one might expect their joint payo¤s to be ex ante pairwise e¢ cient. Otherwise, it becomes certain that (a) there is still "money on the table" between these types and (b) they are certain to meet each other so that they can realize this additional surplus:
Condition 4 Weak pairwise e¢ ciency. For every pair of types c x and v x for which L S (c x ) = 1 and L B (v x ) = 1:
Remark: The latter two conditions are separated because this will make it easier to check them in the models. Alternatively, we could have stated that if for some v x , c x ,
Main Result
In this section, we state and prove our main result: Suppose there is a pair of functions L S ; L B and a sequence of exit rates f k g 1 k=1 such that a given sequence of outcomes fA k g 1 k=1 satis…es the conditions stated before. Then surplus along this sequence becomes e¢ cient: Proposition 1 Suppose some sequence fA k g 1 k=1 satis…es mass balance, monotonicity, no rent extraction, availability, and weak pairwise e¢ ciency for some sequence f k g 1 k=1
and for some pair of functions L B , L S . Then the outcome becomes e¢ cient, i.e. Let its limit be denoted by V S ; V B , Q S ; Q B . We …rst show that Q S ; Q B is in the set of Walrasian allocations Q W for every such subsequence. Then we show that this is
Given the subsequence fA k 0 g 1 k 0 =1 , de…ne threshold types c x and v x as the lowest cost and highest valuation such that traders with these types do not trade with certainty in the limit, i.e.
First, we show that the no rent extraction conditions implies
and
So the payo¤s to all types can be bounded from below once we know the payo¤s of Adding the two inequalities yields a lower bound on the joint surplus of all c and v:
We use the availability and the weak e¢ ciency conditions to show that the right hand side is at least (v c):
We consider two cases for the ordering of c x and v x . First, suppose c x < v x . Take some " 2 (0; v x c x ). By de…nition of c x and v x , and by monotonicity of Q S ( ) and
By the weak e¢ ciency condition:
By continuity of V S ( ) + V B ( ) and by " being arbitrary:
Now consider the case v x c x . Since (v x c x ) is non-positive and payo¤s are nonnegative, we immediately get that
So for both possible orderings of c x and v x the sum of the last four terms in (14) is positive. Hence, payo¤s are pairwise e¢ cient, i.e. for all v and for all c:
According to lemma 3, pairwise e¢ ciency is a su¢ cient condition for the subsequence to become e¢ cient since payo¤s V S k and V B k are monotone. Therefore lim k!1 S (A k 0 ) = S along the subsequence. Hence, by the necessity part of lemma 2, limiting trading probabilities must be Walrasian, i.e. Q S ; Q B must be in Q W .
Because the choice of the subsequence was arbitrary, this implies that the limit of every convergent subsequence is in Q W . BecauseÂ is sequentially compact, this implies 15 By the su¢ ciency part of lemma 2, if the limit of the sequence is in Q W , then the sequence converges to e¢ ciency and
Application of the Main Result

Basic Model
Take a decreasing sequence of exit rates f k g 1 k=1 with k ! 0. By proposition (4) in Lauermann (2006a) , for every k there exists an equilibrium k of the basic model.
Fixing one equilibrium for each k yields a sequence f k g 1 k=0 . With every equilibrium k associate an outcome A k , using the mapping A ( ; ) :
and the other components of A ( ; ) are de…ned similarly. By propositions (2) and (3) in Lauermann (2006a) , this outcome satis…es mass balance. By substituting Q B k into the steady state conditions we can write them entirely in terms of A k :
where
Now we check the conditions.
Monotonicity. For Q S k ( ): Suppose the function is not monotone decreasing for some k and for some c H > c L ,
and this implies that for costs
and thus,
Again, we use a direct implication of optimality:
which implies that for all c the condition holds, since by de…nition of U S ( ; j k ) the above inequality is equivalent to
and similarly for V B k .
. Evaluating the steady state
) is continuous and strictly positive, so there is some g L > 0 such that dG B (v) g l 8v.
Together:
and so for all sequences Q B k ( ) with Q B k (v) < 1:
and similarly for L S k 1 k=1
. Weak E¢ ciency: Suppose for some c x and
. Therefore, the set of types accepting a price p = r k (v x ) is at least the set [v x ; 1]. Therefore, the trading probability
. By de…nition of L B k and q S :
and therefore
where the last line follows from the equilibrium condition for
x (whenever they exist) as claimed.
So fA k g 1 k=1 satis…es our four condition and:
Corollary 1 For every exit rates f k g 1 k=1 with k ! 0 and for every sequence of associated equilibrium outcomes fA k g 1 k=1 of the basic model:
Symmetric Information and Intermediate Bargaining Power
We change the basic model by assuming that traders in each match observe each others' types and that both of them, the buyer and the seller, have a chance to propose a price o¤er. Let 2 (0; 1) be the probability that the seller is chosen to propose a price and let (1 ) be the probability that the buyer is chosen. This is similar to the analysis in Gale (1987) but he considers a discrete set of types instead of a continuum (with discrete types e¢ ciency is harder to get, see 7).
Strategies now account for the role of the trader and for the type of the opponent. Let Let P S p S ; cj F be the probability that a seller who is chosen as a proposer trades in a given period when using p S = p S ( ; )
and let R S r S ; cj F be the probability that the seller trades when chosen to respond:
then the per period probability of trading is D S p S ; r S ; cj F = P S p S ; cj F + (1 ) R S r S ; cj F . Let E RS pjp r S (c) ; c; F be the expected price conditional on trade when responding and E P S pjp r B (v) ; F be the expected price conditional on trade when proposing. Expected payo¤s are implicitly de…ned via
with E P S [p] = E P S pjp r B (v) ; F and E RS [p] = E RS pjp r S (c) ; c; F . Let U P S p; vjp S ; r S ; c; F be the payo¤ when matched with a type v, proposing p and continuing according to p S ; r S :
We de…ne the corresponding functions for buyers analogously.
The steady state conditions do not change. They are
8c (20) and
We de…ne an equilibrium, with x and y denoting types of traders. We require that the price o¤er by the proposer must be optimal for every possible type of the responder and we require that the reservation price has the same properties as derived in the basic model. These requirements incorporate the idea of "sequential rationality":
De…nition 3 A steady state equilibrium vector with full information, F 2 consist of an optimal pair of strategies and a corresponding steady state pool such that 1. p j ; r j 2 arg max U j ( ; ; xj F ) 8x and j 2 fB; Sg 2. p j (x) 2 arg max U P j ; x; yjp j ; r j ; F 8x; y and j 2 fB; Sg We show that payo¤s can be rewritten in a very compact way. Firstly, the optimal price o¤er of a buyer v to a seller of type c is clearly never strictly above r S (c) but either equal to the reservation price or equal to some unacceptable price below, p < r S (c). Hence, the expected price o¤er to the seller conditional upon acceptance is E RS pjp r S (c) ; c; F = r S (c) and similarly for buyers. This implies in particular that a responder is indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting an o¤er. Therefore, expected payo¤s do not change if a trader plans to simply reject all o¤ers. Thus, payo¤s depend only on the price o¤ers a trader makes when being a proposer himself. To derive this payo¤ let q P S be the lifetime trading probability when trading only as a proposer with, using the o¤er strategy p S , where q P S ( ; j ) is the solution to
Rewriting the payo¤ de…nition (19) using q P S and E RS pjp r S (c) ; c; F = r S (c) yields
and similarly for buyers
Now take a sequence of exit rates f k g 1 k=1 with k ! 0 as before and assume that for every k there is some equilibrium. Let this be F k which gives us a sequence f F k g 1 k=1 . Let A k be the outcome of equilibrium F k with A k = A F k ; k de…ned in the natural way. We check only the no rent Extraction condition, because the other conditions are immediate. For this, let U S p S k ( ; ) ; 1; cj F k ; k be the payo¤ to a seller of type c when o¤ering a price p S k ( ; c) when chosen to propose while rejecting any price o¤er when chosen to respond. From (22) :
and from optimality
and together with symmetric reasoning for buyers the …rst parts of the condition holds.
For the limiting part, we show that if the lifetime trading probability Q S k converges to one, then q P S p S k ( ; ) ; cj F converges to one as well. Therefore, (24) implies that whenever Together with V B ( ) being increasing at a rate smaller than one -from the no rent extraction condition -a buyer with a higher valuation trades with a larger set of sellers and hence, the trading probability Q B k ( ) is monotone increasing in v. Analogous reasoning implies the same for sellers. Weak pairwise e¢ ciency is a direct implication of the above observation. Finally, availability follows by the same reasoning as in the basic model, because we are using exactly the same matching technology. Hence: Remark: The crucial step for proving convergence with symmetric information is the following observation: Although it is true that a trader of type c does not need to receive the same o¤ers as a type c x , he can make the same o¤ers when chosen to be the proposer.
Even more so: as we have seen in (22) and (22), payo¤s depend only on the o¤ers made as a proposer. Therefore, a seller of type c can mimic the strategy of another type c x in much the same way as a seller in our basic model can mimic the pricing strategy of another seller. In Lauermann (2006b) I look at the case with symmetric information where buyers are never chosen to be the proposer. There, convergence to e¢ ciency does not hold.
Further Applications
Variants of the basic model that can be analyzed as before include one time entry and second price auctions with reservation prices. In a model with one time entry, time is running from t = 0 to in…nity. In period zero, a unit mass of buyers and a unit mass of sellers arrive with types distributed according to distribution functions G S and G B with the same properties as in the basic model. There is no further in ‡ow in the subsequent periods; Thus, the pool in t 1 consists only of those who did not trade before and who did not die before. So the pool depletes over time. 16 Otherwise, assume that information is asymmetric and sellers make price o¤ers. We can characterize outcomes just as we did with steady state models by considering the ex ante trading probabilities and payo¤s to the entering traders in the …rst period. Their joint expected surplus is the natural welfare criterion. Clearly, mass balance should hold with respect to the ex ante outcome. With Q S 0 ; Q B 0 denoting the …rst period expected lifetime trading probabilities, Q S 0 ; Q B 0 2 Q W is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for e¢ ciency, with Q W as de…ned in (12) . For this model one can show that our conditions hold: By asymmetric information, traders can mimic each other. Just as in the basic model, this implies that trading probabilities are monotone and ex ante payo¤s have a bounded slope. For the availability condition, note that if the ex ante trading probability of some buyers is not one, then these buyers will stay for many periods in the market. One can show that this implies that a seller will become certain to be matched with them some time, i.e. availability holds. Finally, weak e¢ ciency holds by similar reasoning as in the basic model. Thus, our main result applies even to non-steady state markets and the outcome will become e¢ cient with converging to 0.
We can include auctions in the basic model as follows: Suppose matches consist of one seller and a random number of buyers and suppose the seller conducts a second price auction: Upon observing the number of buyers in his group, he announces a reservation price p. Then the buyers submit their bids. Restricting attention to equilibria in dominant strategies, these bids are equal to the reservation prices derived before. This allows a simple characterization of the equilibrium. Suppose we keep the basic model otherwise, that is, we keep the assumption that there is an exogeneous in ‡ow and that there is some death rate . Our conditions hold in this model as well: Monotonicity and no rent extraction follow from asymmetric information, and availability and weak e¢ ciency follow by similar reasoning as in the basic model. Therefore, if sellers can use auctions to sell their goods, with vanishing the outcome becomes e¢ cient.
Extensions
Including an Entry Stage
Suppose we include an entry stage into the basic model, i.e. suppose that new traders must decide whether they want to enter the pool or not. If they enter the pool, they must pay some entry costs e 2 (0; 1). Let Z S ( ) : [0; 1] ! f0; 1g, Z S ( ) 2 M denote the entry decision, with Z S (c) = 1 indicating the decision of type c, v to become active.
Let V S ( ) denote the expected payo¤s to a seller if he enters, gross of e: (V S ( ) is also calculated for those who do not actually become active). Let Z B ( ) and V B ( ) be the corresponding functions for buyers.
We assume that sellers enter whenever this is pro…table, i.e. Z S (c) = 1 whenever V S (c) e and we assume that Z S (c) = 0 otherwise. For buyers we assume the same ,
Let c e 0 be the highest type of a seller such that entry is pro…table, c e 0 sup c; 0jV S (c) e and let v e 0 be the lowest type of a buyer such that entry is pro…table, v e 0 inf v; 1jV B (v) e . By this de…nition, types c > c e 0 or v < v e 0 do not enter. 17 Given the entry stage, the matching technology of the basic model has to be changed to account for the possibility that the two sides of the market might not be identical.
But no matter how this is done, types who do not enter are not available. Therefore, the probability to match some set of buyers might be zero even though the lifetime trading probability of these types is strictly below one. One can show that this failure of availability leads to a failure of convergence to e¢ ciency in the basic model, see section 7. Therefore, stronger forces towards e¢ ciency are needed. In the models by Gale and by Satterthwaite and Shneyerov these forces come from curtailing the bargaining power of the seller. Formally, these models satisfy a stronger condition than condition 4 (weak e¢ ciency). Sequences of trading outcomes that satisfy this stronger condition converge to e¢ ciency even if they satisfy only a weaker availability condition, due to the entry stage.
An outcome A E of a model with an entry stage is a vector V S ; V B ; Q S ; Q B ; Z S ; Z B 2 6 M . Surplus conditional on Q S ; Q B ; Z S ; Z B and gross of entry costs is
with
. These latter functions are the e¤ ective trading probabilities and we work with them throughout this section.
Mass balance with entry is satis…ed if the expected transfers collectively received by all entering sellers are equal to the transfers collectively made by all buyers. Equivalently, the mass of entering seller who trade must be equal to the mass of entering buyers who trade:
De…nition 4 Mass Balance with Entry. An outcome A E satis…es balance of transfers and trades if
and if
We say that an outcome A E is Walrasian if the e¤ective trading probabilities are in such that A E k satis…es mass balance with entry and such that ZQ 2 + :
Take any sequence of outcomes
and a connected sequence of frictions
with ( k ; e k ) ! (0; 0). If the limit of the e¤ective trading probabilities exists we denote them by ZQ S and ZQ B and if the limit of the cut-o¤ types c Note, that for all models with entry there is an equilibrium in which no trader enters.
If a sequence of outcomes includes such outcomes as subsequence, its limit cannot become e¢ cient. Hence, we restrict attention to non-trivial sequences, where entry does not vanish along any subsequence, i.e. with e k ! 0. Then the outcome becomes e¢ cient, i.e.
As before, we take some convergent subsequence of outcomes and denote the limit by V S ; V S ; ZQ S ; ZQ B ; Q S ; Q B . Let v x be the lowest valuation and c x the highest cost that does not trade for sure in the limit:
and we take a further subsubsequence indexed by k 0 such that the cuto¤s v e k 0 0 and c
converge to some v 0 and c 0 . Now we want to show that (ZQ k 00 ) ! Q W . We will argue at the end of the proof that this implies S A E k ! S for the sequence itself.
The no rent extraction condition remained unchanged. Noting that lim Q S k 0 (c) = 1 whenever ZQ S (c) = 1 and symmetrically, lim Q B k 0 (v) = 1 whenever ZQ S (v) = 1, the no rent extraction condition implies just as before:
and we want to derive again a lower bound on the joint payo¤ of c x and v x by showing
If v x c x , we are done by payo¤s being non-negative. So suppose v x > c x . We consider three subcases for the relation between c x ; c 0 ; v 0 ; v x . Subcase 1 is c x < c 0 < v 0 < v x . Then, by de…nition of c x , ZQ S (c x + 0:5") < 1 for " 2 (0; min fc 0 c x ; v x v 0 g).
Thus, L S (c x + ") = 1 by weak availability and, by symmetric reasoning, L B (v x ") = 1.
Therefore, strong e¢ ciency implies
Together with continuity of payo¤s, " being arbitrary, and v 0 c 0 we get
and by continuity of payo¤s and c x = c 0 this implies
c x < c 0 and v 0 = v x . By analogous reasoning:
Subcase 3: c x = c 0 and v 0 = v x . Note …rst, that marginal types must make zero pro…ts in the limit: 
and similarly the mass of buyers who trade becomes
By mass balance of total trades (26), it must be that the mass of entering sellers becomes equal to the mass of entering buyers and G S (c x ) = 1 G B (v x ) . Furthermore, by Q S (c) = 1 for all c < c x = c 0 , no-rent extraction implies
and thus V S (c) V S (c 0 ) + (c 0 c) for c < c 0 . From before, V S (c 0 ) = 0 and so we get
We use this to get an upper bound on the limit of S A E k 0 :
where we used that G S (c x ) is equal to 1 G B (v x ) for the second line and the hypothesis of the subcase, (v x c x ) > 0, for the third line. By S E Q A E k 0 having a limit di¤erent from S E A E k 0 , the mass balance identity (25) ,
) is violated for k 0 large enough. Hence, this subcase is impossible since by choice of the (sub-)sequence A E k 0 each of its elements does satisfy mass balance.
x in all possible cases. Thus, inequality (27) implies that limiting payo¤s are pairwise e¢ cient for all types c and v:
By reasoning analogously to the second part of the main result, this implies
In…nitely Lived Traders
In the literature, it is a common assumption that traders are in…nitely lived and that they discount future payo¤s, see e.g. Gale (1987) . We will show in this section how to apply our approach. In particular, we will have to extend the description of outcomes to account for the di¤erence between discounted and undiscounted transfers and similarly we have to account for the di¤erence between discounted and undiscounted trading probabilities. These di¤erences have an important implication for the resource constraint which we discuss below.
With in…nitely lived agents every trader who enters the market must ultimately trade for otherwise a steady state with a …nite pool is impossible. This makes the inclusion of an entry stage necessary. As before, let Z j ( ) 2 f0; 1g denote the entry decision, with 
An outcome is given by
The mass balance condition becomes
Condition 8 Mass Balance with In…nitely Lived
Players. An outcome A 1 satis…es mass balance if
It is simple to derive an expected surplus maximizing allocation subject to mass balance: All sellers and all buyers enter while transfers are zero. Discounted trading probabilities are one for buyers and zero for sellers and then
Here, we use that discounted trading probabilities and undiscounted trading probabilities can be di¤erent, i.e. we can have 0 Q S Q S 1 . By mass balance, we need Q S 1 to be large so that as many buyers as possible can trade while we need Q S to be small so that costs become small. Because there is no bound on the di¤erence between these two, we can set Q S 1 (c) = 1 while at the same time Q S (c) = 0 for all c. Intuitively, with time running from minus to plus in…nity, sellers trade in…nitely many periods after their entry.
By S max > S , we cannot use S as de…ned in (13) as an upper bound on the surplus as we do in the proof of our convergence result. Therefore we impose some additional constraints on the outcome which are present in the existing models as well. Firstly, we assume that transfers are made only through prices:
Condition 9 Prices only. There are functions p S ( ) 2 M and p B ( ) 2 M such that for all c and for all v:
Secondly, we require that whenever the trading probability of an entering seller of type c is one, his expected transfer must cover at least his costs, i.e. we require that T S 1 c whenever Z S (c) Q S 1 (c) = 1. By Q S 1 (c) = 1 if Z S (c) = 1 and stating the same for buyers, this implies that we want outcomes to satisfy Condition 10 Individual Rationality. An outcome is individually rational if
LetÂ IR be the set of outcomes which satisfy mass balance, prices only, and individual rationality. Together with the de…nition of payo¤s, (29), surplus for any A 2Â IR is given by
Now we want to show that S as de…ned in (13) 
Together with the observation on trading probabilities, a necessary condition for A 0 to be in arg max A2Â IR S 1 ( ) is that
and now the problem of maximizing S 1 ( ) is similar to our earlier problem. Indeed, let Q EW be the set of "Walrasian" outcomes,
then by reasoning analogously to lemma 1, Q EW is the set of the maximizers of the surplus A EW arg max
In the models by Gale (1987) and Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2006) traders are restricted to use prices. In addition, trade is voluntary so that no seller would accept to trade at a price below costs and no buyer would accept to trade at a price above his valuation. Thus, the set of equilibrium outcomes is a subset ofÂ IR and our approach is valid.
Failures
In this section we demonstrate how to use our approach in order to understand why convergence to e¢ ciency fails in some speci…cations of dynamic matching and bargaining games. In the …rst subsection, we discuss who the failure of convergence with symmetric information can be atributed to the failure of the no rent extraction condition. In the following section, we discuss how the simulteneity of decisions in double auctions can lead to the failure of weak e¢ ciency. Finally, we discuss a model with cloning and show that the mass balance conditions does not hold in this case.
We do not provide a speci…cation in which monotonicity is the only condition to fail since there is not such model known in the literature. The failure of availability with an entry stage is discussed at the end of the second subsection and interpreted as a coordination failure when traders have to decide simultaneously on whether to enter the market.
No Rent Extraction fails with Full Information and Asymmetric Bargaining Power
Suppose sellers in the basic model can observe the valuation of the buyer prior to making an o¤er. Clearly, this makes trading within each pair e¢ cient: They trade whenever their trading surplus (v c) is larger than their joint continuation payo¤ can be shown to satisfy monotonicity, availability, and weak e¢ ciency, 21 the no rent extraction condition fails: Since Q B (v x ) = 1 for any v x > v, the condition would require that payo¤s increase with a slope of one, i.e. for
However, the payo¤ to any type v 0 is still zero and his rent (v 0 v x ) is extracted : part of this rent will go to the sellers but part of it is "wasted". 22 Because of this, the equilibrium outcome is not e¢ cient in the limit. 
Weak e¢ ciency is immediate with symmetric information, availability holds because the matching technology is unchanged to the case 2 (0; 1) and monotonicity holds essentially because sellers pro…ts satisfy the strict single crossing condition, i.e. sellers with lower costs prefer to trade with a higher probability at a lower price. Remark 1 Prices with symmetric information are "monopolistic", i.e. p v, by the same reasoning as in Diamond (1971) : Sellers can use the waiting costs 2 (0; 1) to "hold-up" buyers. However, in the models that are used to derive the familiar Diamond paradox, this outcome is still e¢ cient because buyers and sellers are assumed to be homogeneous. 23 Here, ine¢ ciencies …rstly stem from the fact that sellers rather incure rationing than trading at low prices with low valuation buyers and secondly they stem from the possibility of trading for sellers who have costs above p w and who should not.
Weak E¢ ciency fails without Sequential Rationality
Serrano (2002) is the …rst to specify the bargaining protocol as simultaneous double auction. 24 He shows that equilibrium outcomes do not need to becomes e¢ cient. Without going into the details, we can replicate his result in our framework: Suppose we assume in the basic model that the buyer and the seller simultaneously announce a reservation price r and price o¤er p, respectively. Trade happens at the price p whenever the reservation price is below the price o¤er. If we leave the rest of the model unchanged, the following is an equilibrium for every k : p (c) 1 and r (v) 0. In the equilibrium outcome, trading probabilities are zero for all types and S (A k ) = 0 for all k.
While the sequence of outcomes satisfy monotonicity, no-rent extraction, and availability, weak e¢ ciency fails: For any v > c, the trading surplus (v c) is strictly larger than the limiting payo¤s, lim inf V S (c) + V B (v) which are 0. Bargaining is ine¢ cient because of miscoordination between the traders. As observed by Serrano, this failure happens because we cannot use sequential rationality to rule out such equlibria. 25 Note the similarity to the failure of convergence with an entry stage: Setting a price above the highest valuation (and setting a reservation price below the lowest cost) is similar to the decision not to become an active trader. And just as it is a best response not to take an interior bargaining position if no other trader does so, it is a best response not to become active if not other trader does. But note also that just as we can restore sequential rationality by introducing trembles to the price setting decisions we can restore equilibria with trading when traders tremble at the entry decision stage. 26 
Mass Balance fails with Cloning
Cloning refers to the assumption that every trader who leaves the market is replaced by an exact copy of his type, a clone. With this assumption, the in ‡ow depends on the trading outcome and is endogeneous. The pool of traders, however, does not change over time and is exogeneous. Models with cloning have been used by Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) , by Gale (1987) 27 , and recently by De Fraja and Sakovics (2001) . With cloning, equilibrium outcomes might fail to converge to e¢ ciency. 28 We want to understand why.
To understand the negative results we use the symmetric information model of section 5.2. 29 To recall the model: All traders from the pool are matched into pairs. In each pair they observe each others'valuation v and cost c. Then, with probability 2 (0; 1) the sellers is chosen to be the proposer of a price while with probability (1 ) the buyer is chose to be the proposer. The other trader, the responder, can either accept or reject the o¤er. Afterwards, all those pairs in which the responder accepts the o¤er, trade and 2 5 In our basic model, sequential rationality enter via the assumption that buyers use a reservation price which is equal to the continuation payo¤. 2 6 See Gale (1987, p30) who argues that equilibria without entry are not stable. 2 7 Gale considers several specifcations of the in ‡ow process, including one-time entry (in section 5 of his paper), cloning (in the …rst part of section 6) and exogenous in ‡ows (in the second part of section 6). For his critique of the cloning model, see footnote 7.3. 2 8 With e¢ ciency de…ned as in section 3.2. It is not clear, whether this is the appropriate concept of e¢ ciency, see also footnote 7.3. 2 9 The main di¤erences are the following: Rubinstein and Wolinsky assume that c 0 and v 1. Gale (1987) and DeFraja and Sakovics (2001) include an entry stage and have discounting instead of an exit rate. DeFraja and Sakovics in addition use a noisy search technology and assume that a buyer is matched with a random number of sellers. None of these di¤erences a¤ects the main conclusions. leave the pool. An additional share of those who did not trade leaves (dies). Now the new traders enter. But di¤erent from the model in section 5.2, the in ‡ow consists of exact clones of the leaving traders. Therefore, independent of who actually traded, the distribution of traders in the pool at the end of the period is always equal to the distribution in the beginning. Let these distributions be G S ( ) and G B ( ).
For every k , we …x an equilibrium outcome A C k = V S ; V B ; Q S ; Q B of the cloning variant. Since we are using exactly the same matching and bargaining technology as in section 5.2, our four conditions still hold. Therefore, from the …rst part of the proof of the main proposition 1, we know that the outcome must become pairwise e¢ cient for every convergent subsequence, i.e. (1 )
Note, that for = 1 2 , the price p N 1 2 equates the expected surplus of buyers and sellers.
The price p N ( ) depends on the distribution of bargaining power and it is strictly increasing in , i.e. the larger the bargaining power of sellers the higher the price.
Thus, generically, the limiting outcome fails to be Walrasian: Only for a single point it happens that p N ( ) = p w , while for all 2 (0; 1) n , p N ( ) 6 = p w and hence Q S ; Q B = 2 Q W . 31 To illustrate the failure we look at the extreme case with ! 0 when buyers enjoy all the bargaining power. In this case, the condition requires that the price must become zero, lim Therefore, for some k and small enough, the mass balance condition (11) is violated.
Why is it possible with cloning that all buyers can trade? Note that for any 2 (0; 1)
in a given period, the probability for a buyer to …nd a sellers who accepts to trade at Since this assumption has such a strong implication for the results and since they do not claim that cloning is meant to re ‡ect economic conditions, one might try to …nd means other than cloning to solve possible technical problems. Nonetheless, it would clearly be interesting to …nd economic environments that are well modeled by the cloning assumption. In such an environment, the analysis by DeFraja and Sakovics (2001) suggests that the Walrasian prediction might be questionable. 34 3 2 As argued in Lauermann (2006a) , the lifetime trading probabiltiy q S p N ( ) would become
Note that in the model by Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) no ine¢ ciencies arise:
Sellers have homogeneous costs c = 0 and buyers have homogeneous valuations v = 1.
Independent of the trading price, all surplus is realized and the outcome is e¢ cient.
However, the trading price might not be the Walrasian price.
Conclusion
We have introduced a new approach to the analysis of decentralized market with vanishing frictions. By directly characterizing sequences of trading outcomes independent of the …ne details of the trading institution, we have shown which conditions imply convergence to e¢ ciency across di¤erent models. We then validated this approach by
showing that sequences of equilibrium outcomes for models in the literature satisfy these conditions.
Our framework of characterizing outcomes independent of …ne details is also suggestive to the analysis away from the limit, showing how to make robust predictions from the very structure of decentralized trading. In addition to these theoretical contributions, our framework can provide guidance to empirical research in evaluating the prediction of market clearance and its robustness by clarifying the underlying assumptions. In particular, when bargaining power is very unevenly distributed and the stronger side has very good information, the outcome might be far away from the e¢ cient one even for small frictions.
Several open questions remain. First, one would like to be able to have a uniform bound on the e¢ ciency loss. Are there general conditions which guarantee across models that the realized surplus is within " of the e¢ cient surplus for small enough? Secondly, we assumed that p w is known ex ante. In many markets, however, traders are uncertain with respect to demand and supply and p w is a random variable. Can we expect decentralized market to converge to e¢ ciency even if traders have to learn the state of the market? Finally, can decentralized trading solve the problem of coordinating economic activity across markets for di¤erent goods? Dynamic matching and bargaining games seem to be a promising tool for the analysis of these speci…c problems of decentralized decision taking.
Note that S M ( ) is continuously di¤erentiable in M T and the second derivative of
so that surplus is strictly concave in M T .
Therefore, a necessary and su¢ cient condition for M 2 arg max S M ( ) is that the …rst derivative is zero:
which implies that the cuto¤s must be the market clearing price p w : By de…nition of and hence v r S k (c) (1 ) U B p B ; r B ; vj F . Therefore, the probability to trade is independent of whether being a proposer or being a responder. So D S p S k ; r S k ; cj F k ; k = P S p S k ; r S k ; cj F k ; k . This implies that if lim k!1 Q S k (c) = 1 then lim k!1 q P S p S k ( ; c) ; cj F ; k = 1:
implies lim k!1 k P S k p S k 1 = 0 and therefore lim k!1 k P S k p S k 1 = 0. Thus q P S p S k ( ; c) ; cj F ; k ! 1 by
